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T is a commonplace of criticism of Othello that the Moor, entering in Act V to the murder of Desdemona, sees himself as a minister of Justice. It is apparent that this act is full of references to judgment and of images drawn from it. Yet it is usually assumed that this is but an additional tum of the screw, a means of throwing an even more lurid light on Othello's crime against the innocent Desdemona. It is the purpose of this article to put the case that the insistence on justice in Act V of Othello is the culmination to which the drama as a whole is designed to lead, and moreover that a fuller perception of the excellence of the dramatic economy will follow upon the recognition that Shakespeare intends in this play an evaluation of justice in its relation to love.
In Othello jealousy is treated as a state in which man experiences the opposition of two kinds of belief-belief in "evidence" and belief in the person one loves-and the opposition of the value of justice (as he conceives it ) to the value of love. What is tragic in Othello derives from these oppositions. The character of Othello serves but to bring them on; jealousy is the stage on which they stand forth. For in jealousy of this nature and magnitude, justice and love, which in other situations may be conceived of as parallels, meet. It is therefore no accident that Othello is full of allusions to justice and of metaphors drawn from it, since, in the jealousy of Othello, the value of justice and the value of love become openly contestant and reveal their essential incompatibility. The trend of the play becomes clear when one considers the difference between two judgments Othello makes, the one on Cassio:
Cassio, I love thee j But never more be officer of mine, the other on Desdemona: "I kiss'd thee ere I kill'd thee." The judgment on Cassio can be made, though reluctantly, yet without personal conflict, by subscribing to the idea that justice and love are compatible values; but the judgment on Desdemona is preceded by the personal experience of the conflict of those values, and represents a decision between them.
I! is possible to argue that the contention of love and justice begins, in this play, with Brabantio's attempt to bring love under the law, from which attempt it follows that the quality of Othello's and Desdemona's love is declared in a kind of trial scene. Brabantio's accusa-JUSTICE AND LOVE IN OTHELLO WINIFRED M. T. NOWOTTNY 
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Cassio, I love thee; But never more be officer of mine, the otber on Desdemona: "I kiss'd thee ere I kill'd thee." The judgment on Cassio can be made, though reluctantly, yet without personal conflict, by subscribing to the idea that justice and love are compatible values; but the judgment on Desdemona is preceded by the personal experience of the conflict of those values, and represents a decision between them.
It is possible to argue that the contention of love and justice begins, in this play, with Brabantio's attempt to bring love under the law, from which attempt it follows that the quality of Othello's and Desdemona's love is declared in a kind of trial scene. Brabantio's accusa-tion and the subsequent inquiry might, it is true, be dismissed as being no more than a means of providing for the necessary exposition of what has gone before. Shakespeare's intentions in this matter are debatable : it could be that the excellence of the device for expository purposes was the whole of his reason for adopting it, or it could be that he saw this device as being "fit not only to advance the action of a special plot and to exhibit certain traits in p~rticular characters, but also to prompt in an audience's mind a special vein of semiconscious comment or a special mood of reverie about certain general ideas.'" But whatever we make of Brabantio, we cannot deny significance to Cassio's part in illuminating Othello's attitude to justice and love, since Shakespeare uses him, in III, iv, to point a clear contrast between Othello's attitude to these two values, and Desdemona's. In this scene Cassio asks Desdemona to intercede for the rescinding of Othello's judgment upon him, and weighs his chances of reinstatement in Othello's love:
If my offence be of such mortal kind That nor my service past, nor present sorrows, Nor purposed merit in futurity, Can ransom me into his love again ....
In contrast to this reference to Othello's hierarchy of values, in which justice stands higher than love, there follows Desdemona's reflection on the "unkindness" of Othello and then her immediate penetration of her own absurdity in submitting love to the processes of judgment and thereby constituting herself simultaneously plaintiff, witness, suborner, and judge: tion and the suhsequent inquiry might, it is true, be dismissed as being no more than a means of providing for the necessary exposition of what has gone before. Shakespeare's intentions in this matter are debatable: it could be that the excellence of the device for expository purposes was the whole of his reason for adopting it, or it could be that he saw this device as being "fit not only to advance the action of a special plot and to exhibit certain traits in p~rticular characters, but also to prompt in an audience's mind a special vein of semiconscious comment or a special mood of reverie about certain general ideas.'" But whatever we make of Brabantio, we cannot deny significance to Cassia's part in illuminating Othello's attitude to justice and love, since Shakespeare uses him, in III, iv, to point a clear contrast between Othello's attitude to these two values, and Desdemona's. In this scene Cassia asks Desdemona to intercede for the rescinding of Othello's judgment upon him, and weighs his chances of reinstatement in Othello's love:
If my offence be of such mortal kind That nor my service past, nor present sorrows, Nor purposed merit in futurity, Can ransom me into his love again ... .
In contrast to this reference to Othello's hierarchy of values, in which justice stands higher than love, there follows Desdemona's reflection on the "unkindness" of Othello and then her immediate penetration of her own absurdity in submitting love to the processes of judgment and thereby constituting herself simultaneously plaintiff, witness, suborner, and judge:
This theme, made explicit in Act V, is implicit in all that leads to Act V. In particular, it shapes the treatment of Iago and Othello in Act III. For the very setting of the stage for conflict, the creation of the situation which brings it about (Iago's temptation of Othello) is done in terms of the differing processes pertaining to judgment and love, and emphasizes the difference between the kind of belief relevant to the forming of judgments and the other kind of belief characteristic of love. Shakespeare chooses to make Iago's success depend upon the fatal interaction between two things: the weakness of testimony as such (which is Iago's strength), and the strength of love (which, fitted into the context of Iago, becomes its weakness). The first dialogue of the temptation .falls into two parts, separated by Othello's long speech on jealousy (III, iii, .2 In the first part Iago exploits the trickiness of testimony; in the second part he exploits the generosity of love; what is fatal to Othello is the conjunction of the two. It should be stressed that Shakespeare has taken this way of bringing about Othello's mistrust because it allows him to manifest in dramatic terms the pitfalls of reasoning about love and of admitting testimony against it. He shows the process of false testimony succeeding and specifically refers to the reasons why it is impossible to assess it. He posits an !ago entrenched in false opinion; he refers particularly to the impossibility of discriminating between true and false by considering the witness's manner; he shows how the very negatives of testimony can be converted into positives (as Iago, ha'~ng no proof, makes capital of a feigned reluctance to speak); further, he points to the element of construction inseparable from testimony (when Iago protests that he "imperfectly conceits" the significance of his "scattering and unsure observance" and in so doing is able to divulge exactly what is in his mind ) . In short, Iago's testimony is strong in proportion as all testimony is weak; his tricks are possible because of the trickiness of testimony itself. Further, in Othello's speech of protest, Shakespeare adverts to the irony at the root of all these ironies: it is useless for Othello to say "I'll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove," since infidelity does not necessarily produce evidence of itself and fidelity cannot be put to the proof.
Othello's speech over, the dialogue enters its second phase, in which Iago makes capital of the generosity of love. The characteristic irony of this palt of the dialogue is prepared for by Iago's words, I would not have your free and noble nature, Out of self"bounty, be abused; look to 't.
2References are to the Globe Shakespeare.
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This theme, made explicit in Act V, is implicit in all that leads to Act V. In particular, it shapes the treatment of Iago and Othello in Act III. For the very setting of the stage for conflict, the creation of the situation which brings it about (I ago's temptation of Othello) is done in terms of the differing processes pertaining to judgment and love, and emphasizes the difference between the kind of belief relevant to the forming of judgments and the other kind of belief characteristic of love. Shakespeare chooses to make Iago's success depend upon the fatal interaction between two things: the weakness of testimony as such (which is Iago's strength), and the strength of love (which, fitted into the context of Iago, becomes its weakness ) . The first dialogue of the temptation .falls into two parts, separated by Othello's long speech on jealousy (III, iii, .2 In the first part Iago exploits the trickiness of testimony; in the second part he exploits the generosity of love; what is fatal to Othello is the conjunction of the two. It should be stressed that Shakespeare has taken this way of bringing about Othello's mistrust because it allows him to manifest in dramatic terms the pitfalls of reasoning about love and of admitting testimony against it. He shows the process of false testimony succeeding and specifically refers to the reasons why it is impossible to assess it. He posits an !ago entrenched in false opinion; he refers particularly to the impossibility of discriminating between true and false by considering the witness's manner; he shows how the very negatives of testimony can be converted into positives (as Iago, ha'~ng no proof, makes capital of a feigned reluctance to speak) ; further, he points to the element of construction inseparable from testimony (when Iago protests that he "imperfectly conceits" the significance of his "scattering and unsure observance" and in so doing is able to divulge exactly what is in his mind ) . In short, Iago's testimony is strong in proportion as all testimony is weak; his tricks are possible because of the trickiness of testimony itself. Further, in Othello's speech of protest, Shakespeare adverts to the irony at the root of all these ironies: it is useless for Othello to say "I'll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove," since infidelity does not necessarily produce evidence of itself and fidelity cannot be put to the proof.
Othello's speech over, the dialogue enters its second phase, in which Iago makes capital of the generosity of love. The characteristic irony of this palt of the dialogue is prepared for by Iago's words, I would not have your free and noble nature, Out of self~bounty, be abused; look to 't. It is precisely this self-bounty of love (both Desdemona's and Othello's) which he now proceeds to abuse. Desdemona's love had been strong enough to be its own conscience, and is therefore open to another verdict in another context:
IAGo. She did deceive her father, marrying you; And when she seem'd to shake and fear your looks, She loved them most.
OTH. And so she did.
Again, Iago's well-timed "My lord, I see you're moved," makes Othello answer, in loyalty to Desdemona, "I do not think but Desdemona's honest"; he cannot, immediately upon that, challenge Iago for proof. Now, significantly, Othello takes the lead, because it is now the finest part of self-bounty (Iago is not fitted to understand it) which plays him wholly into Iago's hands. Desdemona's love had transcended all obstacles in a magnificent departure from ordinary "nature." It had baffled Brabantio by its unreasonableness. Othello in tnrn, in selfdeprecation, makes the mistake of bringing it to the bar of reason:
And yet, how nature erring from itselfHe does not complete the thought, but its completion is apparent: nature, having left its course, might no doubt lose that fine exaltation and subside to its course again; it would be quite reasonable to suppose that Desdemona had ceased to love. Here for a moment Iago loses track of Othello and takes this to refer to "foul disproportion, thoughts unnatural," hut hastily covers up his mistake and achieves an approximation, though a base one, to Othello's thought:
H er will, recoiling to her better judgement, May ... happily repent.
Othello dismisses him, but the mischief is done, as his soliloquy shows. The way in which Shakespeare has directed the dialogue to illuminate the weaknesses of testimony shows that this scene is much more than a device to bring on Othello's conflict. Obviously it was within Shakespeare's power to have manufactured evidence more credible than Iago's bare tale; in Cymbeline and Much Ado about Nothing he did manufacture it. Here he chooses to make Iago succeed by reason of the gulf between likelihood and love and by reason of the tragic con junction set up when the nature and processes of love hecome involved with the utterly· different nature and processes of judgment. At this point the audience may, already, feel (to use the words of Shakespeare in another play) that it It is precisely this self-bounty of love (both Desdemona's and Othello's) which he now proceeds to abuse. Desdemona's love had been strong enough to be its own conscience, and is therefore open to another verdict in another context:
Again, Iago's well-timed "My lord, I see you're moved," makes Othello answer, in loyalty to Desdemona, "I do not think but Desdemona's honest"; he cannot, immediately upon that, challenge Iago for proof. Now, significantly, Othello takes the lead, because it is now the finest part of self-bounty (Iago is not fitted to understand it) which plays him wholly into Iago's hands. Desdemona's love had transcended all obstacles in a magnificent departure from ordinary "nature." It had baffled Brabantio by its unreasonableness. Othello in turn, in selfdeprecation, makes the mistake of bringing it to the bar of reason:
And yet, how nature erring from itselfHe does not complete the thought, but its completion is apparent: nature, having left its course, might no doubt lose that fine exaltation and subside to its course again; it would be quite reasonable to suppose that Desdemona had ceased to love. Here for a moment Iaga loses track of Othello and takes this to refer to "foul disproportion, thoughts unnatural," but hastily covers up his mistake and achieves an approximation, though a base one, to Othello's thought:
Othello dismisses him, but the mischief is done, as his soliloquy shows. The way in which Shakespeare has directed the dialogue to illuminate the weaknesses of testimony shows that this scene is much more than a device to bring on Othello's conflict. Obviously it was within Shakespeare's power to have manufactured evidence more credible than Iago's bare tale; in Cymbeline and Much Ado about Nothing he did manufacture it. Here he chooses to make Iago succeed by reason of the gulf between likelihood and love and by reason of the tragic con junction set up when the nature and processes of love become involved with the utterly· different nature and processes of judgment. At this point the audience may, already, feel (to use the words of Shakespeare in another play) that it aches To know, when two authorities are up, Neither supreme, how soon confusion May enter 'twixt the gap of both and take The one by the other.'
It is here, however, that Shakespeare parts company with some of his critics (those who debate whether sufficient reason is made out for Othello's believing Iago). It is not my purpose to join in the critical battle over this ground. It need only be observed, in so far as some critics have laboured the irrationality of Othello, that Shakespeare seems to have taken it for granted that jealousy is irrational (to judge from Emilia's comment that men "are not ever jealous for the cause") ; on the other hand, in so far as some critics have laboured the inevitability of Othello's believing Iago (as Coleridge did) it seems relevant to observe that such critics seem concerned to defend Othello from the charge of ignoble irrationality and that this defence too is foreign to Shakespeare's presentation of the case. Shakespeare's own view may be deduced from the way in which he deliberately draws attention, at this very point in the play, to the fact that immunity from jealousy has as little to do with reason as jealousy itself. For when Desdemona enters, as Othello comes to the end of his soliloquy, Iago's edifice trembles:
Desdemona comes:
If she be false, 0, then heaven mocks itself! I'll not believe 'to Immunity from jealousy would lie in the continuance of this simple act of faith. Othello cannot maintain this faith, but if he could, it would still be as non-rational as the jealousy from whose stigma some critics have been anxious to defend him. Shakespeare at this point deliberately forces upon the audience the question, In what strength could Othello reject Iago? The answer would seem to be, By an affirmation of faith which is beyond reason, by the act of choosing to believe in Desdemona. Shakespeare's point is that love is beyond reason. Desdemona's love for Othello has been made "unreasonable" in a way which permits discussion of it in the drama, as when Brabantio tries to bring it to the bar of reason and to punishment by the law, but Othello's race and strangeness (which constitute Brabantio's case) are after all only dramatic heightenings of a simple truism which it is Shakespeare's peculiar excellence to have thought remarkable enough for repeated dramatization: the truism that love, any love, is a miracle.
8Coriolanus~ III J i, 108-12.
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It is here, however, that Shakespeare parts company with some of his critics (those who debate whether sufficient reason is made out for Othello's believing Iago). It is not my purpose to join in the critical battle over this ground. It need only be observed, in so far as some critics have laboured the irrationality of Othello, that Shakespeare seems to have taken it for granted that jealousy is irrational (to judge from Emilia's comment that men "are not ever jealous for the cause") ; on the other hand, in so far as some critics have laboured the inevitability of Othello's believing Iago (as Coleridge did) it seems relevant to observe that such critics seem concerned to defend Othello from the charge of ignoble irrationality and that this defence too is foreign to Shakespeare's presentation of the case. Shakespeare's own view may be deduced from the way in which he deliberately draws attention, at tllls very point in the play, to the fact that immunity from jealousy has as little to do with reason as jealousy itself. For when Desdemona enters, as Othello comes to the end of his soliloquy, Iago's edifice trembles:
Desdemona comes:
8Coriolanus~ III, i, 108-12.
Being a daily miracle, it is not often seen as miraculous; to arrive at that valuation of it costs something, as in King L ear; to fail to arrive at it costs more, as in Othello. With love, reason and justice have ultimately nothing to do.
There is another play of Shakespeare's in which this idea again takes the dramatic form of jealousy and judgment. Leontes is jealous. He brings his wife to judgment. In the trial scene she describes her helplessness in terms wholly applicable to the situation in Othello:
Since what I am to say must be but that 
Within my soul there doth conduce a fight
Of this strange nature that a thing inseparate Divides more wider than the sky and earth .... 4 (V, ii, 142-9) Between the assent of reason to evidence, and the consent of love to a change of belief about its object, there is a great gulf fixed, and to cross it is to experience the terrible passage from one organization of personality to another. Sonnet 138 suggests that it may even seem preferable to descend into the gulf and dwell there:
When my love swears that she is made of truth I do believe her, though I know she lies .... Othello, incapable of this conscious complexity, wishes that at least he might have been deceived:
What sense had I of her stol'n hours of lust?
I saw 't not, thought it not, it harm'd not me: I slept the next night well, was free and merry;
I found not Cassio's kisses on her lips. . . . (III, iii, Troilus is aware of the act of choice inherent in ceasing to believe and of the agony that goes with it; Othello, though he understands nothing of this, cannot avoid experiencing it. This is shown in III, iii, 444 If., where Othello, convinced that Iago's tale is true, acts in gesture the emotional choice:
Now do I see 'tis true. Look here, Iago;
All my fond love thus do I blow to heaven. 'Tis gone.
But it is not. It is impossible to make that choice without a reorientation of personality, and therefore the gesture is followed by the terrible images in which he calls upon himself for a reversal in the depth of his nature and the dethroning of the might and dominion of love:
Arise, black vengeance, from thy hollow cell! Yield up, a love'thY crown and hearted throne To tyrannous hate! Swell, bosom, with thy fraught.
The poetry, markedly, docs not describe this change as taking place of itself; it shows Othello commanding it to take place. For in truth the change of belief which Othello thinks inseparable from his acceptance of Iago's story is not inseparable-it is an emotional non sequitur. Othello does not, like Troilus, recogoize and define the separateness, but he feels and acts according to its laws: he has to command the All my fond love thus do I blow to heaven.
'Tis gone.
But it is not. It is impossible to m ake that choice without a reorientation of personality, and therefore the gesture is followed by the terrihle images in which he calls upon himself for a reversal in the depth of his nature and the dethroning of the might and dominion of love:
Arise, black vengeance, from thy hollow cell! Yield up, 0 10ve' thY crown and hearted throne To tyrannous hate! Swell, bosom, with thy fraught.
The poetry, markedly, docs not describe this change as taking place of itself; it shows Othello commanding it to take place. F or in truth the change of belief which Othello thinks inseparable from his acceptance of raga's story is not inseparable-it is an emotional non sequitur. Othello does not, like T roilus, recognize and define the separateness, but he feels and acts according to its laws: he has to command the emotional "effect" to accompany its "cause." The paradox illustrates the truth of Troilus' discovery that there is in the soul a "bi-fold authority" -on the one band, reason, and on the other the naked will to believe by which the categories of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" are altogether transcended. Othello is not the man to admit the possibility of a "madness of discourse, That cause sets up with and against itself," but this does not alter the fact that his experience, like that of Troilus, involves the conflict between two images of the woman he loves.
Shakespeare has already shown, earlier in the same scene, that what Othello thinks of as uncertainty of mind is in reality an intolerable emotional tension which demands violent expression:
I think my wife be honest and think she is not; I think that thou art just and think thou art not. I'll not endure it. Would I were satisfied! Here we have, first, Othello's attempt to interpret his conflict as uncertainty of mind, and his desire to end it (as he thinks he could) by proof. This counterfeit of the problem is followed immediately by the real problem, the two images of Desdemona: Hfresh as Dian's visage"; "begrimed and black." From this tension of incompatibles springs the impulse to violence. With ".Would I were satisfied!" he reverts to the illusion that proof will quiet that volcano whose raging we have glimpsed. The very form of this speech, enclosing within two patent rationalizations a reality of experience betrayed directly in imagery, shows that the inner conflict between two modes of belief about Desdemona is the heart of the matter and that Othello, in interpreting it to himself as uncertainty of mind, is simply providing the conflict with a surface rationalization. And it is the urgency of the conflict and of the resultant impulse to end it by violent action that explains Othello's snatching at I ago's lies about Cassio and the handkerchief: by so doing, he can turn the force of his emotions into the current of revenge. It is significant that the image in which he expresses his determination to be revenged (the image of the Pontic sea) contains the promise of release: he promises himself a revenge as "capable arid wide" as the Propontic and the Hellespont.
It is one of the finest strokes in the construction of the play that Shakespeare puts the vow of revenge before the test of the handkerchief. By so doing, he makes clear in the action what he has already JUSTICE AND LOVE IN OTHELLO 337 emotional "effecf' to accompany its "cause." The paradox illustrates the truth of Troilus' discovery that there is in the soul a "bi-fold authority" -on the one band, reason, and on the other the naked will to believe by which the categories of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" are altogether transcended. Othello is not the man to admit the possibility of a "madness of discourse, That cause sets up with and against itself," but this does not alter the fact that his experience, like that of Troilus, involves the conflict between two images of the woman he loves.
I think my wife be honest and think she is not; I think that thou art just and think thou art not. I'll not endure it. Would I were satisfied! Here we have, first, Othello's attempt to interpret his conflict as uncertainty of mind, and his desire to end it (as he thinks he could) by proof. This counterfeit of the problem is followed immediately by the real problem, the two images of Desdemona: "fresh as Dian's visage"; "begrimed and black." From this tension of incompatibles springs the impulse to violence. With ".Would I were satisfied!" he reverts to the illusion that proof will quiet that volcano whose raging we have glimpsed. The very form of this speech, enclosing within two patent rationalizations a reality of experience betrayed directly in imagery, shows that the inner conflict between two modes of belief about Desdemona is the heart of the matter and that Othello, in interpreting it to himself as uncertainty of mind, is simply providing the conflict with a surface rationalization. And it is the urgency of the conflict and of the resultant impulse to end it by violent action that explains Othello's snatching at Iago's lies about Cassio and the handkerchief: by so doing, he can turn the force of his emotions into the current of revenge. It is significant that the image in which he expresses his determination to be revenged (the image of the Pontic sea) contains the promise of release: he promises himself a revenge as "capable arid wide" as the Propontic and the Hellespont.
It is one of the finest strokes in the construction of the play that Shakespeare puts the vow of revenge before the test of the handkerchief. By so doing, he makes clear in the action what he has already suggested in the poetry: that the idea of revenge, though it seems to Othello to fDllow from what he now thinks Df DesdemDna and offers him the iIlusiDn Df release frDm the conflict Df his emDtions, is nDt in fact OthellD's whole bent. If he could unify himself by revenge, that wDuld be one way Dut, but he cannDt; the test Df the handkerchief is a desperate attempt to unify himself in the oppDsite way-by having Desdemona prDve that what IagD has said is false. OthellD's descriptiDn to Desdemona Df the mystic nature Df the handkerchief-A sibyl ...
In her prophetic fury sew'd the work;
The worms were hallow'd that did breed the silk; And it was dyed in mummy which the skilful
Conserved of maidens' hearts-
is not an irrelevance; he is in reality asking DesdemDna to restore to him the sacredness Df lDve.' After the failure of this attempt, he is nDt seen until Act IV, and Act IV concentrates on shDwing the dreadful interim within Othello when the disjunction of his personality rages fDr expression and cannDt find the means.
It is in Act IV that the nature of the action affDrds indisputable proDf that Shakespeare has in this playa unified design which utterly transcends that concern for immediate theatrical effect which SDme critics wDuld have us impute tD him, fDr in this act "theatrical effect" is least satisfactory as an explanation Df Shakespeare's chDice of episodes. Othello falls in a fit; he strikes DesdemDna in public; he goes to her as to a prostitute. If these things are chosen Dnly fDr their immediate effect, the chDice is extraDrdinary, fDr Act IV is, in itself, hardly tD be bDrne. Its effect is accurately described by the words of De Broglie: "Le spectateur contemple ce tableau, non point avec cette curiosite inquiete qui passe tour a tour de la crainte a respoir, mais ... avec quelque chose de cette angDisse inexprimable qui s'empare de naus lorsque, dans une Cour de justice, nous assistons aux vains efforts de malheureux entrain"s vel'S une cDndamnation fatale et indubitable."· This is not an effect which Shakespeare often risked. The Dther tragedies increase in iIluminatiDn as the end approaches; even Macbeth, nearest to Othello in the increasing denigration Df the hero, 10Dks forward in Act IV tD a better future-the line of Banquo passes before our eyes, and as the act closes, 
In her prophetic fury sew'd the work;
Conserved of maidens~ hearts-
is not an irrelevance; he is in reality asking Desdemona to restore to him the sacredness of love.' After the fai lure of this attempt, he is not seen until Act IV, and Act IV concentrates on showing the dreadful interim within Othello when the disjunction of his personality rages for expression and cannot find the means.
It is in Act IV that the nature of the action affords indisputable proof that Shakespeare has in this playa unified design which utterly transcends that concern for immediate theatrical effect which some critics would have us impute to him, for in this act "theatrical effect" is least satisfactory as an explanation of Shakespeare's choice of episodes. Othello falls in a fit; he strikes Desdemona in public; he goes to her as to a prostitute. If these things are chosen only for their immediate effect, the choice is extraordinary, for Act IV is, in itself, hardly to be borne. Its effect is accurately described by the words of De Broglie: "Le spectateur contemple ce tableau, non point avec cette curiosite inquiete qui passe tour a tour de la crainte a l'espoir, mais .. . avec quelque chose de cette angoisse inexprimable qui s'empare de ncus lorsque, dans une cour de justice, nous assistons aux vains efforts de malheureux entraines vers une condamnation fatale et indubitable.'" This is not an effect which Shakespeare often risked. The other tragedies increase in illumination as the end approaches; even Macbeth, nearest to Othello in the increasing denigration of the hero, looks forward in Act IV to a better future-the line of Banquo passes before our eyes, and as the act closes, Is ripe for shaking, and the powers above Put on their instruments.
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In Othello Act IV is wellnigh insupportable. Is not the reason that it is the inescapable outcome of Act III and, more important, the indispensable preparation for Act V, in that the intolerableness of Act IV is the means by which the audience is made to experience, like Othello himself, the necessity for release? The perfection of Shakespeare's art here consists in the economy by which he brings about this participation of the audience in the hero's tragedy: the violence in the action, which creates tension in the audience, is motivated within Othello himself by his tension, a tension which is the result of his failure in Act III to unify himself either by the vow of revenge or by making Desdemona restore to him his undcsecrated love. When Act IV opens, it immediately becomes clear that Othello's decision to revenge has in no way touched his real problem. He has even forgotten how he decided: when Iago reminds him of the handkerchief, he says, o! it comes o'er my memory,
As doth the raven o'er the infected house,
Boding to all. But though indecision is over, tension is at its greatest; Othello now has the experience as it really is-the tension between two Desdemonas, between two Othellos. ( Othello's image in IV, i, 192-4, "my heart is turned to stone, I strike it and it hurts my hand" is the equivalent, in the sphere of the emotions, of Troilus' "madness of discourse, That cause sets up with and against itself"; with Othello as with Troilus "a thing inseparate Divides more wider than the sky and earth.") The episodes of Act IV manifest and communicate this tension by the dreadful spectacle of Othello's attempts to escape from it. The pitch rises as his ways of seeking relief draw, horribly, ever nearer to Desdemona and to the deepest intimacies of love. The falling in a fit is a temporary way of not bearing the tension. That, shocking as it is, affects only himself. The next way is the striking of Desdemona. His striking her in public (for in their private interview there is nothing of this ) is a symbolic act: a calling the world's attention to the intolerableness of what he suffers by the intolerableness of what he does. The treating Emilia as a brothel-keeper is an expression of the division in him at its deepest level: to go to his wife as to a prostitute is to try to act out what the situation means to him. Already Othello is driven to symbolize his conflict in act-to scek actions that will express the im-
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Is ripe for shaking, and the powers above Put on their instruments.
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In Othello Act IV is wellnigh insupportable. Is not the reason that it is the inescapable outcome of Act III and, more important, tbe indispensable preparation for Act V, in that the intolerableness of Act IV is the means by which the audience is made to experience, like Othello himseU, the necessity for release? The perfection of Shakespeare's art here consists in the economy by which he brings about this participation of the audience in the hero's tragedy: the violence in the action, which creates tension in the audience, is motivated within Othello himself by his tension, a tension which is the result of his failure in Act III to unify himself either by the vow of revenge or by making Desdemona restore to him his undcsecrated love.
When Act IV opens, it immediately becomes clear that Othello's decision to revenge has in no way touched his real problem. He has even forgotten how he decided: when !ago reminds him of the handkerchief, he says, o! it comes der my memory,
As doth the raven o'er the infected house,
Boding to all. But though indecision is over, tension is at its greatest; Othello now has the experience as it really is-the tension between two Desdemonas, between two Othellos. (Othello's image in IV, i, 192-4, "my heart is turned to stone, I strike it and it hurts my hand" is the equivalent, in the sphere of the emotions, of Troilus' "madness of discourse, That cause sets up with and against itself"; with Othello as with Troilus "a thing inseparate Divides more wider than the sky and earth.") The episodes of Act IV manifest and communicate this tension by the dreadful spectacle of Othello's attempts to escape from it. The pitch rises as his ways of seeking relief draw, horribly, ever nearer to Desdemona and to the deepest intimacies of love. The fa1ling in a fit is a temporary way of not bearing the tension . That, shocking as it is, affects only himseU. The next way is the striking of Desdemona. His striking her in public (for in their private interview there is nothing of this) is a symbolic act: a calling the world's attention to the intolerableness of what he suffers by the intolerableness of what he does. The treating Emilia as a brothel-keeper is an expression of the division in him at its deepest level: to go to his wife as to a prostitute is to try to act out what the situation means to him. Already Othello is driven to symbolize his conflict in act-to seck actions that will express the im-possible. But none of these things will serve. Othello is not seen full face again until, in Act V, he finds the perfect symbolic act: to kill, not in hate but in love.
The scene of the murder of Desdemona is a visible demonstration of the laws inherent in the process that led up to it. This is a drama of an error of judgment, the error being in the application of judgment to love. It is not, however, surprising, that the relation of Act V to all that goes before has been imperfectly seen, for the perception of that relation depends upon our recognizing the terrible propositions about human justice which Shakespeare laid down for himself to work by: as, that justice, however it is conceived of, cannot be executed in love ; that love and justice differ in their natures, their processes, and their conclusions; that justice, though ideally conceived of as an expiating sacrifice or as the only cure for a wound in the fitness of things, may be, in its human origin and motivation, indistinguishable from man's need to find redress for what he cannot bear to find in human nature; that, finally, the man who accepts justice as the supreme value in life will, if he be wholly consistent, at last execute himself. I believe all these propositions to be implicit in the play. If their starkness should cause us to deny them or simply not to see that such questions arise, then Act V cannot be seen as the logical outcome of Acts I-IV. The fact that Othello perpetrates injustice in no way weakens the significance of Act V, for the play turns upon the conflict between justice and love, not upon the nature of justice itself. No aspect of Othello's experience of that conflict would have been different if Desdemona had in fact been false (though if she had been false, Othello's experience would have been incommunicable to an audience; the audience's participation in his conflict depends upon its having, as he has, two images of her-his image, and the truth ).
In Act V, the significance is so entirely fused with the poetry and the action that it is only by faithful attention to these that we can rightly estimate what Shakespeare was about; this is sufficient reason for pondering every phase of the action, and all the meaning that the poetry carries, even at the risk of being thought to consider too closely or of being accused of attempting to explain poetry and genius.
First, then, let us consider the opening soliloquy of Act V, scene ii: "It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul. ... " It is to our great loss that we let these words pass as some oracular utterance not susceptible of commentary. We may begin by inquiring what "cause" meant in Elizabethan English. It meant, first, the accusation or charge against someone, as in King Lear (IV, vi, , "What was thy cause? 340 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY possible. But none of these things will serve. Othello is not seen full face again until, in Act V, he finds the perfect symbolic act: to kill, not in hate but in love. The scene of the murder of Desdemona is a visible demonstration of the laws inherent in the process that led up to it. This is a drama of an error of judgment, the error being in the application of judgment to love. It is not, however, surprising, that the relation of Act V to all that goes before has been imperfectly seen, for the perception of that relation depends upon our recognizing the terrible propositions about human justice which Shakespeare laid down for himself to work by: as, that justice, however it is conceived of, cannot be executed in love; that love and justice differ in their natures, their processes, and their conclusions; that justice, though ideally conceived of as an expiating sacrifice or as the only cure for a wound in the fitness of things, may be, in its human origin and motivation, indistinguishable from man's need to find redress for what he cannot bear to find in human nature; that, finally, the man who accepts justice as the supreme value in life will, if he be wholly consistent, at last execute himself. I believe all these propositions to be implicit in the play. If their starkness should cause us to deny them or simply not to see that such questions arise, then Act V cannot be seen as the logical outcome of Acts I-IV. The fact that Othello perpetrates injustice in no way weakens the significance of Act V, for the play turns upon the conflict between justice and love, not upon the nature of justice itself. No aspect of Othello's experience of that conflict would have been different if Desdemona had in fact been false (though if she had been false, Othello's experience would have been incommunicable to an audience; the audience's participation in his conflict depends upon its having, as he has, two images of her-his image, and the truth ).
First, then, let us consider the opening soliloquy of Act V, scene ii: "It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul. . .. " It is to our great loss that we let these words pass as some oracular utterance not susceptible of commentary. We may begin by inquiring what "cause" meant in Elizabethan English. It meant, first, the accusation or charge against someone, as in King Lear (IV, vi, , "What was thy cause? Adultery? . . . die for adultery! No." Secondly, in an even more specialized sense, it meant the matter about which a person went to law, or the case of one party in a suit. In a third sense, it meant the end in view or the object for which a deed is done. Or again, in a very pregnant sense, it meant good, proper, and adequate ground for action (as Cassia uses the word in "I never gave you cause"). Which of these meanings does Shakespeare intend? He intends the first, the charge against Desdemona; he also intends the second, Othello's case against her; he intends the fourth, in that Othello thinks himself to have good, proper, and adequate ground for action; and indeed he also intends the third, the end to which the action shall be done. The end to which the murder shall be done is, simply, release from the whole agony. In the phrase itself, as in the action it refers to, Othello's complex attitude is unified: Desdemona is guilty and he has a case against her, but what he is about to do is to him an action just in every way, and what he is about to do has a purpose, the making of an atoning sacrifice which sball make all well. The word unites the personal, the social, and the religious aspects of justice, just as the killing is to answer every need of his nature that he recognizes: the need for punishment, for abstract justice, for the restoration of the ideal image of Desdemona by an atoning sacrifice, and, one might add, a need deeper than all these, the need to possess her again-for murder is now the only act of possession open to him.
Knowing how much "cause" means, we can now grasp the whole phrase, "It is the cause." Said t hrice, it evidently has depth under depth of meaning for Othello; two ways, at least, in which the phrase has meaning, are apparent. First, it may be taken as the answer to the unspoken question, "What is it that makes me do this?"-"It is the cause." Secondly, the phrase may be interpreted as an utterance of recognition: "it" (the act of killing ) "is" (is the same thing as) "the cause" (the whole state of affairs between us) . In other words, Othello has found the act which corresponds to all he feels, though what he feels is a complex of opposites, for the act is symbolic; to describe that act he finds the word which means all that the act means, and the syntax which enables him to describe the act as being the same thing as all those opposites he feels, and therefore their expression, and therefore his release. The killing itself is in this sense symbolic : it is an act which stands for all the warring emotions pent up in Othello. These emotions are now fused in a calm of pure concentration on the symbolic act, an act which is the only possible way for Othello to express at once all that Desdemona means and all that he means. He has the JUSTICE AND LOVE IN OTHELLO 341 Adultery? . . . die for adultery ! No." Secondly, in an even more specialized sense, it meant the matter about which a person went to law, or the case of one party in a suit. In a third sense, it meant the end in view or the object for which a deed is done. Or again, in a very pregnant sense, it meant good, proper, and adequate ground for action (as Cassio uses the word in "I never gave you cause") . Which of these meanings does Shakespeare intend? He intends the first, the charge against Desdemona; he also intends the second, Othello's case against her ; he intends the fourth, in that Othello thinks himself to have good, proper, and adequate ground for action; and indeed he also intends the third, the end to which the action shall be done. The end to which the murder shall he done is, simply, release from the whole agony. In the phrase itself, as in the action it refers to, Othello's complex attitude is unified: Desdemona is guilty and he has a case against her, but what he is about to do is to him an action just in every way, and what he is about to do has a purpose, the making of an atoning sacrifice which shall m ake all well. The word unites the personal, the social, and the religious aspects of justice, just as the killing is to answer every need of his nature that he recognizes : the need for punishment, for abstract justice, for the restoration of the ideal image of Desdemona hy an atoning sacrifice, and, one might add, a need deeper than all these, the need to possess her again-for murder is now the only act of possession open to him. Knowing how much "cause" means, we can now grasp the whole phrase, "It is the cause." Said thrice, it evidently has depth under depth of meaning for Othello; two ways, at least, in which the phrase has meaning, are apparent. First, it may be taken as the answer to the unspoken question, "What is it that makes me do this?"-"It is the cause." Secondly, the phrase may be interpreted as an utterance of recognition: "it" (the act of killing ) "is" (is the same thing as) "the cause" (the whole state of affairs between us) . In other words, Othello has found the act which corresponds to all he feels, though what he feels is a complex of opposites, for the act is symbolic; to describe that act he finds the word which m eans all that the act means, and the syntax which enables him to describe the act as being the same thing as all those opposites he feels, and therefore their expression, and therefore his release. The killing itself is in this sense symbolic: it is an act which stands for all the warring emotions pent up in Othello. These emotions are now fused in a calm of pure concentration on the symbolic act, an act which is the only possible way for Othello to express at once all that Desdemona means and all that he means. H e has the exaltation of having struck a perfect equipoise. But what he is about to do would cease to be an all-embracing symbol if he defined its relevance to anyone aspect of the problem: if he were to put the act into defining words, they would break up the symbol, for if the act is vengeance, it cannot be justice or atonement, and if it is any of these, it is not passion; and if it is not all of these, it is not release. Hence Othello's refusal to define:
Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars!-It is the cause.
Because of all that "cause" means to Othello, its real emotional meaning is "solution," and because the solution is simply, and as absolute symbol, the act of killing, there is no transition between those words, "It is the cause" and the next, "Yet I'll not shed her blood." It is as though he had said, "The solution is to kill, yet I'll not shed her blood." Then, the moment he looks at Desdemona-at her skin as "smooth as monumental alabaster" -he is forced to give himself a reason why he should destroy her: "Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men." As soon as one reason is given, the symbol begins to dissolve, and to stop the dissolution of his symbol, he must cease to see anything but that-and so, "Put out the light, and then put out the light." This again is an act of a purely symbolic nature; again he identifies in one action two entities objectively different but emotionally the same : Desdemona, and the light he extinguishes in order not to see her; indeed, it is as though the parallelism of the two acts constituted their logic. The blackness of the act is matched by the blackness in which alone it can be performed. Othello's state is one in which pattern and relationship take the place of reasoning. As in the parallel, "Put out the light, and then put out the light," so in the whole situation: that an act fits is the whole reason for its being done. To kill in love; to revenge by justice; to kill the guilty Desdemona for the honour of the innocent Desdemona, or to sacrifice the innocent Desdemona to atone for her guilt; to torture her because she has tortured him and to torture himself in torturing her-in all this it is the pattern that constitutes the logic, for it is the pattern of his feelings. It is moreover only through pattern and symbol (so tranced is his state) that he can consider the finality of his act:
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister, I can again thy former light restore, Should I repent me: but once put out thy light.
When I have pluck'd the rose, I cannot give it vital growth again .... exaltation of having struck a perfect equipoise. But what he is about to do would cease to be an all-embracing symbol if he defined its relevance to anyone aspect of the problem: if he were to put the act into defining words, they would break up the symbol, for if the act is vengeance, it cannot be justice or atonement, and if it is any of these, it is not passion; and if it is not all of these, it is not release. H ence Othello's refusal to define:
Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars 1-I t is the cause.
Because of all that "cause" means to Othello, its real emotional meaning is "solution," and because the solution is simply, and as abso--lute symbol, the act of killing, there is no transition between those words, " It is the cause" and the next, "Yet I'll not shed her blood." It is as though he had said, "The solution is to kill, yet I'll not shed her blood." Then, the moment he looks at Desdemona-at her skin as "smooth as monumental alabaster" -he is forced to give himself a reason why he should destroy her: "Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men." As soon as one reason is given, the symbol begins to dissolve, and to stop the dissolution of his symbol, he must cease to see anything but that-and so, "Put out the light, and then put out the light." This again is an act of a purely symbolic nature; again he identifies in one action two entities objectively different but emotionally the same: Desdemona, and the light he extinguishes in order not to see her; indeed, it is as though the parallelism of the two acts constituted their logic. The blackness of the act is matched by the blackness in which alone it can be performed. O thello's state is one in which pattern and relationship take the place of reasoning. As in the parallel, "Put out the light, and then put out the light," so in the whole situation: that an act fits is the whole reason for its being done. To kill in love; to revenge by justice; to kill the guilty Desdemona for the honour of the innocent Desdemona, or to sacrifice the innocent Desdemona to atone for her guilt; to torture her because she has tortured him and to torture himself in torturing ber-in all this it is the pattern that constitutes tbe logic, for it is the pattern of his feelings. It is moreover only througb pattern and symbol (so tranced is his state ) that he can consider the finality of his act:
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister, I can again thy former light restore, Should I repent me: but once put out thy light. . When I have pluck'd the rose, I cannot give it vital growth again ... .
As if this achievement of expressing emotion through form were not sufficient, Shakespeare has all the while developed, within the tranced patterns of Othello's utterances, the great impersonal pattern of Justice and Love. It is in the growing intensity of Othello's realization of his continuing love, counterpointed by the growing compulsiveness of the sanctions of justice which he must allege to outdo it, that Shakespeare expresses the major conflict of the drama. Faced by the fact that love continues, even in this extremity, Othello is driven to urge higher and higher the claims of that justice which shall destroy it. Justice has already been called in under its aspect of safeguard of society: "Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men." Love persists. Justice is then called in as an abstract ideal. Love, still, can almost persuade her to break her sword, and hints that the threatened act of destruction is at heart the act of possession, of plucking the rose. Justice, in a final terrifying aggrandisement, claims the ultimate possible sanction, the sanction of love: " ... this sorrow's heavenly; It strikes where it doth love." The process is complete. Justice overrides love by presenting itself as love. In this parallel ascent, where the claims of justice rise with the claims of love, Shakespeare has manifested their tragic contestation, and through the form of the poetry he has shown how the act of killing is related at one level to the tension of opposites in Othello and at a deeper level to the fundamental and eternal opposition of justice and love.
Desdemona wakes. So must Othello. He had thought to strike in heavenly sorrow; he strikes with "Down, strumpet!" From the height of his intention to the depth of the execution the descent is inevitable: at no point in the dialogue could Desdemona's plea for life produce effects other than it does, for the issue of love against justice is settled now; there must inevitably rise up, within Othello's temple of sacrificial justice, the asseverating wrathful self, accusation and self-vindication streaming from its lips: o perjured woman! thou dost stone my heart, And makest me call what I intend to do A murder, which I thought a sacrifice.
It is indeed only the executioner who fully knows the resistance of the sacrificial victim. In human justice as it is commonly ordered the executioner need not question the motive of the judge, nor the judge question his own. With Desdemona, Othello is judge and executioner; he is also plaintiff, and the only possible witness for the defence. In him justice confounds itself by the concentration of all its persons in As if this achievement of expressing emotion through fonn were not sufficient, Shakespeare has all the while developed, within the tranced patterns of Othello's utterances, the great impersonal pattern of Justice and Love. It is in the growing intensity of Othello's realization of his continuing love, counterpointed by the growing compulsiveness of the sanctions of justice which he must allege to outdo it, that Shakespeare expresses the major conflict of the drama. Faced by the fact that love continues, even in this extremity, Othello is driven to urge higher and higher the claims of that justice which shall destroy it. Justice has already been called in under its aspect of safeguard of society: "Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men." Love persists. Justice is then called in as an abstract ideal. Love, still, can almost persuade her to break her sword, and hints that the threatened act of destruction is at heart the act of possession, of plucking the rose. Justice, in a final terrifying aggrandisement, claims the ultimate possible sanction, the sanction of love: " ... this sorrow's heavenly; It strikes where it doth love." The process is complete. Justice overrides love by presenting itself as love. In this parallel ascent, where the claims of justice rise with the claims of love, Shakespeare has manifested their tragic contestation, and through the fonn of the poetry he has shown how the act of killing is related at one level to the tension of opposites in Othello and at a deeper level to the fundamental and eternal opposition of justice and love.
Desdemona wakes. So must Othello. He had thought to strike in heavenly sorrow; he strikes with "Down, strumpet!" From the height of his intention to the depth of the execution the descent is inevitable : at no point in the dialogue could Desdemona's plea for life produce effects other than it does, for the issue of love against justice is settled now; there must inevitably rise up, within Othello's temple of sacrificial justice, the asseverating wrathful self, accusation and self-vindication streaming from its lips: o perjured woman ! thou clost stone my heart, And makest me call what I intend to do A murder, which I thought a sacrifice.
It is indeed only the executioner who fully knows the resistance of the sacrificial victim. In human justice as it is commonly ordered the executioner need not question the motive of the judge, nor the judge question his own. With Desdemona, Othello is judge and executioner; he is also plaintiff, and the only possible witness for the defence. In him justice confounds itself by the concentration of all its persons in one, and in being so confounded by unity, throws into relief the indivisible and unconfounded unity of love.
There remains the revelation of the truth. Justice now comes into its own. In Measure for Measure, justice pointed to its impartiality:
When I, that censure him, do so offend, Let mine own judgement pattern out my death .. . . ( II, i, (29) (30) Otbello has killed Desdemona for betraying their love; he kills himself for the same reason. He surveys his life, judges it, passes sentence, and executes it, as long ago he did in Aleppo:
Where a malignant and a turhan'd Turk
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, J took by the throat the circumcised dog And smote him, thus.
Othello's death is perfectly consistent with his life. From first to last, he is the judge.
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Where a malignant and a turban'd Turk Othello's death is perfectly consistent with his life. From first to last, he is the judge.
